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Executive Summary
This chapter establishes the interconnection between existing environmental
global governance systems and cyberspace/cybersecurity as well as the first
ever parallel between the environmental (liability) regime and the nascent
cybersecurity  regime.  Understanding  the  interconnections  between  these
and the role of  law,  policies  and practices  in  the European High North
(EHN)  is  critical  to  understanding  the  variables  affecting  both  climate
change  and  cyberspace.  Although  climate  change  and  cyberspace  are
different  phenomena,  the  risks  associated  with  both  of  them  are
anthropogenic  and  can  affect  the  same  critical  equities,  including  key
sectors such as water, food and energy infrastructures. The aim of this study
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is  to  better  grasp  the  development  of  cyberspace  and  its  revolutionary
impact on human behaviour and human security.  This chapter  examines
and addresses  four core  ideas:  (1)  the linkage between climate change,
environmental  threats  and  cybersecurity  in  the  EHN;  (2)  how  the
interconnectedness  of  environmental  threats  and  cybersecurity  can  be
identified,  managed  and  regulated,  including  aspects  of  governance  for
cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the EHN; (3) how cyberthreats and
their  related  risk  assessments  can  be  incorporated  into  regulatory
frameworks  in  order  to  create  proactive  rather  than  reactive  law  by
exploring which is the best regulatory framework (or possible combination)
applicable among different areas of law; and (4) the current cyberthreats,
for  example,  in  the  energy  industry  and  specifically  to  critical
infrastructures (CIs) of the energy system, which will advise on the need to
design a future agreement incorporating the notion of human security.
 5.1 Introduction
This chapter  analyses  the interconnection between global climate change
and cyberspace by showing links and similarities between the two spheres
and establishing for the first time a parallel between selected focal points of
the environmental regime (in particular the environmental liability regime)
and the nascent  cybersecurity  regime.  Acknowledging and understanding
these interconnections is critical for devising policies and practices in the
European High North (EHN). This chapter examines the shared space of
similarities  between  environmental  regime  systems  (including  variables
affecting climate  change) and  cyberspace  frameworks.  Although the two
regimes are different, they are exposed to the same risks associated with
anthropogenic effects that might affect the same critical equities, including
key sectors such as water, food and energy infrastructures. 
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The present chapter investigates how the development of cyberspace, with
its  revolutionary  impact  on  human  behaviour  and  human  security,  is
contributing to social progress. By understanding the risks that come with
cyberspace,  we  can  secure  not  only  the  environment  but  also  human
activities and security. The latter, viewed in an untraditional way and in a
broader context at the global level, is not only confined to state security and
physical actions. It also includes environmental threats as a consequence of
climate change impacts. By showing how risks from human activities are
strictly interconnected with the use of cyberspace and related technologies,
this  chapter  demonstrates  the  need  to  couple  environmental  and
cybersecurity regulations in order to produce a joint regulatory response.
The development and use of digital products and services depends on the
functioning of  infrastructures,  which are under constant  stress from both
societal and environmental factors.
 5.2 Core guiding questions and responses
This chapter examines four core guiding questions:
1. Is there a linkage between climate change, environmental threats 
and cybersecurity in the EHN, and if so, what is the nature of this 
linkage?
2. How can the interconnectedness of environmental threats and 
cybersecurity be identified, managed and regulated, including 
aspects of governance for cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the 
EHN?
3. How can cyberthreats and their related risk assessments be 
incorporated into regulatory frameworks in order to create 
proactive rather than reactive law? Which is the best regulatory 
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framework (or possible combination) applicable among different 
possible areas and levels of regulations?
4. What are the current cyberthreats, for example, in the energy 
industry and to critical infrastructures (CIs) of the energy system?
CIs and their protections against individuals, groups and foreign nations are
strictly intertwined with cybersecurity and the peace of cyberspace (Fidler,
2015). CIs are strictly dependent on cyberspace and are heavily digitalised,
especially in the case of the energy sector (oil, gas, electricity and nuclear),
which is more exposed to environmental climate conditions/threats as well
as cyberthreats. Cyberthreats and environmental threats interact with CIs in
a negative synergistic way and make CIs even more vulnerable to risks. CIs
in the energy sector are particularly at risk of cyberthreats and cyberattacks,
especially in the EHN countries, such as Norway, Sweden and Finland. It is
necessary to evaluate the risks of cyberattacks damaging CIs. 
There  is  no  precise  or  agreed  upon  definition  of  CIs,  with  definitions
varying between countries. The European Commission (2004, p. 3) defined
CIs as ‘physical  and information technology facilities,  networks, services
and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on
the  health,  safety,  security  or  economic  well-being  of  citizens  or  the
effective functioning of governments’. CIs in the energy system are linked
to  environmental  and  climate  change  threats,  such  as  rising  sea  levels,
which  also  pose  a  threat  to  people  living  in  coastal  areas.  Therefore,
environmental threats can affect not only the ecology of an area but also
human security (Cassotta,  S.,  Sidortsov, R.,  Pursiainen,  C.,  Goodsite,  E.,
Cyber threats, harsh environment and the European High North (EHN) in a
human security  and  multi-level  regulatory  dimension:  Which  framework
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applicable  to  critical  infrastructures  under  “exceptionally  critical
infrastructure conditions” (ECIC)? Beijing Law Review, 2019, 10.
This  chapter  addresses  four  key  questions  to  frame effective  regulations
regarding  the  interconnection  between  environmental  threats  and
cybersecurity  and  to  suggest  how  a  governance  response  should  be
structured to connect the two areas. The consequences of digital disruptions
reach  beyond  the  costs  associated  with  clean  ups,  repairs  and/or
replacements of affected CIs to include economic, social and environmental
disruptions.  Thus,  this  chapter  contributes  to  developing  strategies  for
mitigating the impact of cyber-threats on the EHN, thereby acknowledging
the existence of a connection between the two regimes. The integration of
the key sectors and factors as well as the application of the same principles
of  environmental  law  to  both  regimes  has  been  particularly  fruitful  in
understanding how to create a safe future for the EHN, which in turn will
promote human security.
From a  theoretical  perspective,  this  chapter  uses  and  combines different
parts of scientific literature drawn from theories of international regimes,
including studies on the role of international relation theories, international
law,  transnationalism,  theories  of  complex  interdependencies  and  global
environmental  politics.  These  research  streams  in  the  political  science
literature can prove helpful in addressing the core questions of this chapter.
This approach is based on Elinor Ostrom’s (2012) legal framework applied
to  cyberspace,  which  can  help  to  conceptualise  the  connection  between
cyberspace and environmental regimes. Through this method, institutional
analysis design and socio-ecological systems (Ostrom, 2012) complement
legal theories based on legal pluralism and polycentrism (Petersen & Zhale,
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Arnaud,  1995).  This  chapter  is  based on a theoretical  framework that  is
operationalised through the concept of exceptionally critical infrastructure
conditions (ECICs) and CIs in the energy system using a multilevel context
(global and regional) without neglecting the domestic dimension of sources
of law and policies in Norway and Sweden.
From a methodological perspective, this study uses process tracing; legal
analysis of both hard and soft law including legal acts, treaty provisions,
policy reports and diplomatic speeches; and comparative analysis between
different sources of law and policies analysed with a multilevel approach as
method  of  assessment.  In  addition,  the  approach  was  interdisciplinary,
combining law and political  science to  explore which international  legal
framework would be most applicable to addressing cyberthreats to CIs if
environmental  law  did  not  prove  useful.  An  example  is  the  case  of
cyberthreats  to CIs in the energy sector of the EHN, which inspired the
suggested regime formation processes to achieve effectiveness in terms of
environmental protection and security goal achievements
 5.3 Conceptualising and governing the linkage 
between environmental governance and 
cybersecurity
This chapter conceptualises the linkage between environmental governance
and cybersecurity by addressing the core guiding questions of this research.
The first two core questions address the linkage between climate change,
environmental  threats  and  cybersecurity  in  the  EHN  and  how  the
interconnectedness  of  environmental  threats  and  cybersecurity  can  be
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identified,  managed  and  regulated.  These  questions  include  aspects  of
governance for cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the EHN. This research
was conducted based on 1) the concept of ECICs and the law in the EHN;
2)  the  nexus  between  climate  change,  environmental  threats  and
cyberthreats in a multi-regulatory, contextual, sustainable global approach
with Sweden as a case study; and 3) the  most appropriate framework for
addressing cyberthreats and the harsh environment in the EHN.
 5.3.1 Concept of ECICs and the law in the EHN
To our knowledge, no one in the field of cybersecurity and climate change
has  suggested  that  cybersecurity  is  an  important  tool  for  economic
development, but at the same time, the target of cyberthreats to CI, which in
the  Arctic  EHN  become  extra  critical  given  the  harsh  environmental
conditions  and  vast  distances.  Given  this  extra-criticality  due  to  the
environmental conditions, especially the impact of climate change (Cassotta
& Sidortsov, 2019), this chapter argues that CIs under ECICs are forged by
climate  change  (such  as  flooding;  rising  sea  levels;  and  interruption  of
maritime routes, electricity and communications), especially in the energy
sector  due  to  its  increased  exposure  to  environmental  threats  and  its
connection with major military and civilian installations. This chapter uses
Norway  as  an  example,  arguing  that  if  Norway’s  energy  assets  were
attacked  by  Russia  or  another  country,  if  its  communications  were
interrupted or if an oil spill occurred, these would be extra critical because
vessels would be put in distress,  communications jeopardised and rescue
operations made more difficult. This implies the need to create a plan at the
intersection between cyberspace and harsh environmental conditions. In this
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new way of thinking, the environment, cybersecurity and CIs interact with
social  and  human  security  determinants.  Cybersecurity  needs  to  be
reconceptualised  from a  green  perspective  that  links it  to  environmental
considerations to ensuring sustainability regarding both environmental and
human  security  issues  as  well  as  a  healthy,  stable  global  ecosystem
(Shackelford, 2016). CIs under ECICs need special legal protections due to
the cascading effect, which is an effect that increases dependencies among
CIs,  which  could  trigger  cascading  failures  and  multi-sectorial  collapses
(Van Eeten, 2011). Given that climate change is hitting the Arctic harder
than any other region of the world, and that the effects will be reflected in
the rest of our planet (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007),
the  significance  of  the  cascading  effect  is  amplified,  especially  for  the
category of events with low probability and high consequences. We found
that  although  it  is  possible  to  map  which  legislations  are  potentially
applicable for protecting CIs against cyberthreats,1 many researchers feel
that  the  applicable  legislations  are  fragmented  (Hathaway  et  al.,  2012;
Radzziwill, 2007; Schmitt, 2017; Tsoagourias & Buchan, 2016). Findings
from our study have shown that no treaties or regional agreements based on
sustainable protection of CIs under ECICs exist in the Arctic. Such a legal
framework is necessary because CIs in the Arctic are crucial for economic,
military and security issues and are strictly interconnected with the concept
of human security, as explained previously.
1 Legislation applicable to protection against cyberthreats include jus ad bellum laws (such
as the Law of Armed Conflict), the Charter of the United Nations, space law, laws of state
responsibility, international humanitarian laws, international criminal laws, international
laws applicable to terrorism, human rights laws, internet laws or the law of the sea (such
as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).
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These CIs host many data hubs, and significant energy resources depend on
digitalisation,  the  internet  and  computer  commands.  Disruptions  due  to
climate change impacts,  such as flooding, ice,  nuclear radiation or other
climate  disasters,  require  new  proactive  responses  and  methodologies.
Frequent  climate  changes  (storms,  cyclones,  rising  sea  levels,  water
scarcity,  drought,  heat  waves  and  warmer  temperatures)  can  threaten
nuclear power plants and their infrastructure. 
In  addition,  research has  shown that  sustainability  fails  when CIs  under
ECICs are not protected. Sustainable development is defined in the report
Our  Common  Future  (also  known  as  the  Brundtland  Report)  as
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission
on  Environment  and  Development,  1983).  International  practices  and
doctrines  on  sustainable  development  are  also  applicable  to  cyberspace
(Shackelford,  2016).  Important  principles  of  environmental  law  that  are
linked to the concept of sustainable development include the polluter-pays
principle, the precautionary principle and the principle of prevention. Both
the concept of sustainable development and environmental law principles
can  offer  research  areas  in  which  to  analyse  the  cybersecurity  of  CIs
exposed to climate conditions. The connection between sustainability and
cybersecurity is based on the need for social and economic progress and
sustainable development in civil society. 
In  the  management  of  cyberthreats,  both  the  public  and  private  sectors
should be involved in managing the interests of stakeholders. The private
sector is often faced with managing cyberthreats as part of an effort to build
trust with different groups through business activities such as joint ventures,
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mixed  agreement,  hybrid  business  practices  or  corporate  social
responsibility practices (Shackelford 2016). In this context, trust is defined
as confidence that a computer system will behave as expected. Cyberthreats
to CIs can be managed by utilising cybersecurity’s best available practices
and technologies while expanding internet access. Consensus standards are
often  necessary  to  harmonise  an  industry’s  best  practices,  for  example,
providing flexible and cost-effective approaches to enhancing cybersecurity
measures  that  assist  owners  and  operators  of  CIs  with  assessing  and
managing risks. In cases where sustainable business practices are equipped
to deal with issues of trust, cybersecurity and cyber peace can offer business
models on which to grow business practices. This chapter argues that CIs
under ECICs require a new paradigm of sustainable climate cybersecurity
that relies on the intention to protect CIs through environmental laws and
sustainability. Sustainability fails if the linkage between CIs and ECICs is
not governed through laws (Cassotta & Sidortsov, 2019).
 5.3.2 Nexus between climate change, environmental threats 
and cyberthreats in a multi-regulatory, contextual, sustainable 
global approach with Sweden as a case study
Studies  have been conducted with the precise aim of drawing a parallel
between  environmental  regulations,  the  cyberspace  and  cybersecurity
systems. Many aspects of the cybersecurity system are unknown and highly
fragmented (Hathaway, 2012; Radzziwill, 2007; Schmitt, 2017; Tsoagourias
& Buchan,  2016).  A study of  Swedish  cyber  strategy  in  relation  to  the
environmental regime is being conducted in order to better understand how
to improve the effectiveness of the complex cyber regime from a contextual
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perspective. One way to better understand cybersecurity systems is through
an interdisciplinary  study of  how best  to  coordinate  these  systems,  thus
making both cyber law and policy more effective. This study will provide
evidence on how to take inspiration from a regime system (environmental
law or, more concretely, the environmental liability framework) and use it
as a source of inspiration to understand and shape the formation of another
system in another area, namely cybersecurity.
The  methodology  consists  of  choosing  and  applying  key  aspects  of
environmental law (such as concepts and principles) and comparing them
with similar key aspects of cybersecurity. To make this comparison, multi-
level governance will be applied by analysing the sources of law and policy
existing at global, regional and national/local levels in order to understand
the interactions between these different levels.
The analytical task for this research consists of choosing focal points from
the environmental liability system that are similar and comparable to those
of  the  cyber  framework.  This  study  has  highlighted  the  difficulty  of
identifying  the  party  responsible  for  environmental  damage.  In  cases  of
diffuse pollution due to climate change effects, it is very difficult to identify
the potential polluter and cause of the damage. The same can be said for
cyber damages, as often it is impossible to identify the source of the cyber
threat. This study concentrates on three focal points: 1) Who is responsible?,
2)  How  is  risk  managed?  and  3)  How  is  international  cooperation
organised?  Other  issues,  such  as  liability,  leadership  and  insurance  (for
example, whether the cyber system is encountering the same difficulties as
the  environmental  system  when  it  comes  to  the  conceptualisation  of
insurance), has been treated.
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 5.3.3 Best framework for addressing cyberthreats and the 
harsh environment in the EHN
This study highlights that economic development opportunities in the EHN
are accompanied by the danger of cyberthreats, especially to CIs. Building
on this, this study will develop the concepts of ECIC and law in the EHN
from the previously discussed article (Section 4.3.2). This study will build
upon the previous concept of ECICs with the addition of new ideas;  for
example,  a  new condition of  extra criticality should also include human
security concerns to avoid human disasters.  CIs pertaining to the energy
sector are especially relevant in the EHN in terms of cyber threats since
these CIs are more exposed to environmental threats. This sector is in large
part  dependent  on digitalisation,  the internet  and demands of  computers.
The  digitalisation  of  CIs  can  face  interference  from  cyberthreats  and
climatic  conditions,  such  as  ice  and  natural  disasters.  Thus,  new
methodologies of assessment and effective legal frameworks are needed to
protect these CIs. Through this, the concept of human security will evolve
from  merely  physical  security  based  on  concrete  impacts  to  virtual  or
intangible human security existing in cyberspace. This implies that society
must be protected by rules regulating these new kinds of human security
risks. Society’s growing dependence on CIs and systems has resulted in a
new  class  of  security  threats.  Because  cyberthreats  can  come  from
anywhere  in  the  world  and  their  sources  are  difficult  to  pinpoint,  an
examination of the CIs under ECICs requires a comprehensive analysis of
the  existing  sources  of  law and  policy  at  the  national  (including  local),
regional and international levels to observe how pluralistic systems of legal
and political sources could apply and interact with complementary legal and
95
non-legal tools. In this study, Norway represents the domestic level (which
includes  the  local  dimension),  the  European  Union  (EU)  represents  the
regional  level  and  several  selected  treaties  represent  the  international
level.The concept of ECICs is based on recent definitions of criticality in
Norway, especially those found in the recent Norwegian approach, which
consists of a collection of reports, laws and strategies (DSB, 2014, pp. 183-
202;  DSB,  2017;  Forsvarsdepartementet,  2016;  Kommunal-og
moderniseringsdepartement,  2015;  The  Ministry  of  Government
Administration,  Reform and Church  Affairs,  2013;  The Nordic  Page,  24
March 2015).
Norway represents  a  good case  study for  a  global-local  approach  and  a
possible  source  of  inspiration  for  future  agreements,  strategies  and
management of the Arctic areas of the EHN. Svalbard has been chosen as a
sub-case of the global-local approach, representing the local dimension. The
reason for adopting the Norwegian model is because this model takes into
account vulnerabilities and locations of CIs (particularly in relation to harsh
environmental conditions). Svalbard demonstrates that most of the potential
threats mentioned in the national  risk assessment are valid in the Arctic.
However,  some  specific  issues  can  make  CIs  in  the  Arctic  area  more
vulnerable, most notably the long distances and harsh winter conditions. In
general, the overall strategy of Svalbard is to identify the bottlenecks and
locate and enhance redundant systems to overcome natural, technological
and man-made threats.
Norway is a relevant case study area because of its focus on information
security,  protective  security,  vulnerabilities  and  locations  of  critical
information  systems equipment  and  their  relation  to  weather  conditions.
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Norway can be used as a model for designing a legal framework to protect
CIs in the energy sector against cyberthreats and as a source of inspiration
for the drafting of future agreements in the Arctic and in the EHN area
because it  combines sources of law and policy in an integrative manner.
This  also  demonstrates  that  the  applicability  of  international  law  and
regional  law  dealing  with  cyberthreats  to  CIs  cannot  be  isolated  from
domestic  and  local  dimensions.  Interaction  between  different  levels  of
governance is a must. 
What is particularly interesting about the Norwegian case study is the how
the country conducts risk assessments and focuses on information security.
Norwegian law includes sections on identification and sensitive information
(information that  might  damage installations or  affect  the power  supply,
such as vulnerabilities or location; Cassotta et al., 2019). The Norwegian
approach is based on four principles that are relevant for this analysis: 1) the
responsibility principle, which implies that an agency that is responsible for
a  sector  or  an  issue  under  normal  circumstances  is  also  responsible  for
handling extraordinary events; 2) the equality principle, which states that
the normal daily organisation structure should be maintained (as much as
possible) during extraordinary events; 3) the subsidiarity principle, which
explains  that  extraordinary  events  should be  handled  at  a  lower  level  if
possible; and 4) the cooperation principle, wherein each authority, function
or  agency  must  take  responsibility  for  organising  the  best  possible
cooperation with all relevant actors for the prevention of, preparedness for
and response to extraordinary events.
The  Norwegian  approach  also  includes  a  specific  and  inspiring
cybersecurity response framework. All these mentioned components of the
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Norwegian model are lacking in other regional levels, such as at the EU and
international levels. According to the Norwegian perspective, even though it
could be argued that  the  Arctic  is  much less  critical  in  terms  of  danger
exposure  to  cyber  threats  due  to  its  smaller  population,  there  is  less
redundancy and longer distances in some areas at times cold weather that
can justify this concept. While the consequences may be small in terms of
the number of victims, they can be enormous in terms of severity. 
The existence of ECICs is also supported by the cascading effects of CIs
and general climatic cascading effects, which are not linked to cybersecurity
and  CIs  but  rather  to  the  peculiar  geographical  location  of  the  Arctic
(Intergovernmental  Panel on Climate Change, 2017).  The authors  of this
study  have  advocated  that  these  two  types  of  cascading  effects  act
cumulatively and interact. 
The first cascading effect of CIs explains that increasing dependencies on
CIs could trigger cascading failures and multi-sectorial collapse (Van Eeten,
2011).  This cascading effect  belongs to the category of  events  with low
probability  and  high  consequence.  The  potential  of  a  domino  effect  is
undeniable. Organisational and state involvement is not clear or easy, and
states do not actually know how to deal with cascading effects (Van Eeten,
2011).
The second cascading effect of CIs is defined in this research as the climatic
cascading effect of the Arctic. According to this condition of the climatic
cascading effect, the Arctic is the thermic regulator for the entire planet, and
thus events  that  occur  there  will  not  remain isolated  to  that  region.  For
example, if an oil spill or nuclear explosion were to occur in this region, it
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would have enormous repercussions for the rest of the planet (Cassotta &
Goodsite, 2013). This is enough to justify the need for extraordinary legal
and political measures to protect CIs in the Arctic.
The impact of this second cascading effect could not only affect the cultural
heritage of the indigenous rural populations in this area, thus contributing to
jeopardising  their  survival  and  leading  to  their  extinction,  but  also  the
extinction of humankind in the rest of the world due to the critical position
of the Arctic. This is why environmental governance and cybersecurity for
CIs  in  the  energy  sector  within  the  Arctic  EHN must  be  linked  to  and
incorporated with the concept of human security (Cassotta et al., 2019).
In  the  EHN  region,  the  procurement  of  natural  resources  is  being
increasingly managed through cyber control. Outlining the identification of
a possible regulatory framework for this technology is important not only in
terms of  national  legislation but also in  view of this  local,  regional  and
international network.
An examination of the laws governing cyberthreats to CIs under ECICs is
also  important  for  practical  experts  and  policymakers  in  the  field  of
international security by contributing to the concept of human security. This
research has therefore mapped the legal and political framework protecting
CIs in the EHN using Norway as a case study because this country is highly
dependent on both cyber technology and CIs, such as offshore industries.
Digitalised offshore activities are very relevant in Norway since this country
is  highly  dependent  on  these  operations,  especially  transportation,
aquaculture and fish farming.
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At the regional level, EU law provides significant potential for covering and
protecting  CIs  in  the  EHN,  denoting  the  existence  of  a  complex
cybersecurity  regime  that  is  not  yet  consolidated.  However,  from  this
analysis, it can be deduced that the current cybersecurity regime, including
issues of cyberthreats and cyberattacks to CIs under ECICs in the EHN, is
not yet a consolidated regime but rather a complex process that requires
further development. The mapping of related legal and political frameworks
in this research has helped to establish a foundation for how a framework
against  cyberthreats  and  cyberattacks  to  CIs  under  ECICs  in  the  EHN
should be developed through combining different levels of governance.
This therefore leads to the following research question: based on a human
security focus, in the case of cyberthreats to CIs under ECICs in the EHN,
what recommendations can be made to improve international and regional
laws? Thus, not only does an analytical overview of the many international
accords  operating  in  different  areas  of  law  need  to  be  undertaken,  but
domestic mechanisms must also be considered. Hence, our study shows that
it is possible to use a human security focus in the case of cyberthreats to CIs
under ECICs in the EHN, and it details how such an assessment can provide
recommendations  to  improve  international  and  regional  law.  In  order  to
assess the possibility of refitting existing legal and non-legal instruments to
fill the gap in international and regional law as well as address the research
questions of the study, this research has formulated two main assumptions.
The first assumption is that the Norwegian model could represent a legal
and  policy  framework  to  improve  the  applicability  of  international  and
regional law for designing proactive legal mechanisms to achieve human
security goals in a pluralistic context.  The second assumption is that  the
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Norwegian model  should be combined with a  pluralistic  and polycentric
patchwork  of  governance  –  such  as  standards,  strategic  tools,  risk
assessment approaches and a backdrop of cooperation and coordination at
the geopolitical level – in order to enhance the applicability of international
and regional law.
The issue of cyberattacks to CIs under ECICs in the EHN is supported in
this  chapter  by  a  discussion  of  scientific  publications  coauthored  with
specialists in these sectors (CIs and energy infrastructures), which provides
an opportunity to expand the notion of human security. However, the issue
of possible cyber-attacks to CIs exposed to environmental threats could also
be  perceived  negatively  as  a  disrupter  to  Arctic  collaboration  and
coordination. This leads to the question of how this coordination can be
reconciled with the activities of relevant international organisations, such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. It is important
to remember that two of the EHN countries, Finland and Sweden, are not
part of NATO, and Norway is not a member of the EU (although it is a
member of  the European Economic Agreement  and thus covered by EU
legislation on cybersecurity).
The  role  of  NATO  is  particularly  interesting  compared  to  other  Arctic
regional institutions with non-existent  or weak roles  in the enactment of
legislation. These regional institutions (such as the Arctic Council, Barents
Europe Arctic Council, Barents Regional Council and Nordic Council  of
Ministers) cannot competently deal with cybersecurity or security issues,
nor can they govern the nexus between environmental governance, CIs, the
energy sector and cybersecurity under ECICs. More important is that NATO
is the only institution (compared to the other existing Arctic institutions)
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that is dealing with the linkage between environmental governance, climate
change and cybersecurity under ECICs through international cooperation.
For example, one of these responses is to achieve resilience. In this context,
approaches to risk assessment and resilience in the EHN (as defined by both
civilian and military agencies) focus on system resilience, which is required
for unknown and hybrid threats (Cassotta et al., 2019). According to NATO
(2016), resilience and increased civil-military readiness are recognised as
key  goals  for  dealing  with  threats  to  digitalised  CIs,  including
anthropogenic  (cyberattacks)  and  environmental  (space  weather  or  other
extreme weather events linked to climate change) threats.
 5.4 Conclusion
Currently,  at  the international,  EU and national  levels,  there is  a lack of
uniformity in the laws protecting CIs. There is no regional or even global
approach in terms of  human security.  However,  a theoretical,  applicable,
regulatory framework could be applied. 
It  is  found  that  existing  international  legal  frameworks  do  not  directly
address cyberattacks because they were formed prior to the emergence of
cyberspace, but they could still be used in the instance of such attacks. A
satisfactory  regulatory  framework  integrating  law  and  policy  should  be
uniform and  homogeneous  and  should  include  the  possibility  to  govern
freedom from risks in order to design a law based on a precautionary and
proactive rather than reactive approach. 
In  terms  of  governance,  such  a  framework  should  not  be  based  on  a
monistic  vision  of  the  sources  of  law  but  rather  on  a  pluralistic  and
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polycentric vision, wherein sources of law and policy from both the public
and  private  sector  overlap  and  coexist.  Thus,  law  and  policy  utilising
different tools (such as standards, soft law and technical expertise) would
coexist in a patchwork mix of instruments. 
CIs under ECICs represent a crucial  empirical opportunity to understand
how to strategically design a patchwork palimpsest composed of a mix of
different regulatory pluralistic instruments that will aid policy makers. The
policy  design  should  include  freedom from hazards,  freedom  from  fear
(addressing the conflict of a humanitarian agenda), freedom from want (in
the context of a human development agenda) and freedom of dignity (with
reference to human rights, the rule of law and good/effective governance).
In light of this pluralistic and polycentric perspective, this study examined
the  interactions,  pros  and  cons  of  different  categories  of  regulatory
instrument  mixes.  This  study  emphasised  that  in  the  context  of  cyber-
realpolitik,  this mix of instruments  is  connected to collateral  governance
issues, such as environmental climate threats, international relations, public
and private approaches to human security and standards. 
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